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The belief that regional cooperation is imperative for the survival of the 
South Pacific has become so widely accepted as to virtually enjoy the status of a 
political axiom. While this verity is scarcely gainsaid within or without the South 
Pacific, the implementation of a regional approach has involved numerous difficult 
decisions particularly in recent years. At the heart of many of these problems has 
been the felt need to reconcile the national aspirations of the constituent states 
and a general but less concrete desire for regional cooperation. However, as 
decolonization has proceeded in the South Pacific the attachment to regionalism 
and the rhetoric which expresses this attachment have tended to develop faster 
than the capacity for regional cooperation. The resulting lacuna between 
expectation and reality has in turn created further problems for regional 
cooperation in the South Pacific. Nowhere are these stresses more evident than in 
relations between the South Pacific Commission (SPC) and the South Pacific 
Forum. 
One of the key weaknesses in the contemporary rhetoric of South Pacific 
regionalism derives from its preoccupation with regionalism as a single monolinear 
progression. As each stage of development is passed a new stage of regionalism 
emerges unfettered by the previous limitations. This perspective on regionalism is 
rather naive, I believe, and would appear not to be based on either the theory or 
. practice of regionalism. Thus whereas the present debate has tended to focus on 
the question, "what is the right type of regional organization for the region?"; I 
would prefer to recast the question in these terms, "what type of regional system 
will best serve the South Pacific?" The first perspective presupposes a choice 
between the SPC and the Forum while I would argue that such a choice is 
unnecessary if each body develops a mutually satisfactory reciprocal relationship. 
Further, I would suggest that the outline of such a reciprocal relationship is not 
only possible but indeed is already visible. It appears to me that the South Pacific 
and regional cooperation wlll be much improved if the systemic rather than 
organizational approach is adopted. 
The Rationale for Regionalism 
t 
The academic literature is replete with expl.anations for regional association 
but not all of these are appropriate to the South Pacific. For example, one of the 
oldest reasons for regional cooperation is military security (despite the fact that 
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historically proximity has been the grounds more for enmity than amity). This 
justification has thus far not underpinned regionalism in the South Pacific. The 
ANZUS Agreement of 1951 was for many years assumed to confer some residue 
collective security on the region, of course, but it did not and still does not directly 
involve any South Pacific states other than Australia and New Zealand. Federation 
is another general rationale which has had little specific application to the South 
Pacific. There was a period between the two World Wars when some consideration 
was given to federating the British, Australian and New Zealand colonies and 
another briefly after 1945 when it was fashionable to propose the poli tical union of 
Melanesia. Nevertheless these musings proved to be tangential to the subsequent 
thrust of South Pacific regionalism. 
More germane are explantations based on economic and cultural influences. 
These two (augmented by administrative efficiency and histprical ties) are the 
principal grounds upon which the present infrastructure of regional association has 
been built. For the European states which imposed the area's first experience of 
regional cooperation on the Islands, the more important of tIle two has always been 
economics. The metropolitan powers have tended to view the small. isolated and 
resource-poor countries of the South Pacific as economically suspect. To help 
create a more viable economic situation the Western states have, in word if not in 
practice, advocated the achieving of economies of scale through supra-national 
cooperation. On the whole, they have treated such cooperation as something of a 
logical necessity based on Western notions of economic viability. 
The Island states have generally accepted the economic argument in 
principle although their perception of the need for regionalism takes a different 
tack. For the South Pacific leaders, the sense of commonality arising from cultural 
affinity figures rnuch more prominently in their calculations of the value of 
regionalism than this question has in the minds of Western officials. Further, while 
Europeans have tended to see regional cooperation as an economic imperative the 
Island leadership is inclined to view it in more voluntaristic terms. They are 
agreed, in the main, that their economic development will be enhanced by regional 
cooperation but they are less convinced that such development depends on trans-
national association. 
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Before pursuing in some detail the evolution of regionalism in the South 
Pacific, I would make a few further comments on the general justifications for 
regionalism since this theoretical framework does color my analysis of the current 
problem in the South Pacific. The functionalist school (or, as it has become known 
more latterly after years of revision, the neo-functionalist school) within the field 
of international relations seeks to explain the origin and prospects of regional 
institutions by relating the purposes for association to the intensity of the regional 
relationship. I A fundamental tenet of the functionalist persuasion holds that non-
political organizations (i.e., those institutions which exist to serve limited 
"functional" needs such as trade, common social services, and development) are 
comparatively non-controversial and, by preceding political association, help to 
give rise to a climate in which political institutions will emerge successfully. This 
phenomenon is referred to as ramification or the "spill-over" effect; that is, non-
political cooperation tends to ramify, or spill-over, into political cooperation. Thus 
over time the relatively low-level of agreement that is required to create a 
functional regional organization will unintentionally conduce to a higher level of 
agreement which makes more sophisticated structures of regional organization 
possible. The rich amalgam of specialist and poli tical regional institutions in 
contemporary Europe is self-consciously functionalist in its inspiration and 
development. It should be noted that, although this approach suggests a 
progression, functionalism implies a diverse and wide range of regional contacts 
which are not monolinear. 
Joseph Nye suggests a typology of regional integration which serves not only 
to define the characteristics of regionalism but also provides a rather simple 
ordinal scale for measuring the level of regional association. Nye's typology is 
based on variations in structural or organizational relationships among the 
participating governments. At the simplest level, that of "token integration," there 
is "an ephemeral expression of the supra-state sense of community without any 
significant restructuring of interests." A stage higher is the "security community 
in which regional institutions and symbols are sufficiently accepted to create a 
sens~ of illegitimacy of violent conflict among members." The third level, "limited 
functional cooperation," involves a rather greater degree of interaction based on 
"the sharing of costs of limited services, such as a regional airline, or monetary 
cooperation or the establishment of regional development banks." Economic 
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associations ranging from free trade areas through customs unions and common 
markets to economic unions represent the fourth level of regional integration while 
the fifth, and highest, stage is reached with "direct political unification.,,2 
Regionalism in the South Pacific, I believe, has now achieved a level 
somewhere in the middle to upper end of Nye's stage three; that is, a fairly 
effective degree of limited functional cooperation. Before it lies the glittering 
prizes of the fourth tier's economic associations. While it is neither automatic or 
even necessary that the transition be made, a certain subliminal functionalist 
imperative within the region appears to be compelling the participants to make the 
attempt to push South Pacific regionalism one step further. Here is where the 
rhetoric, already in stage four, creates problems for the realities, still consolida-
ting the gains of stage three. The sort of limited functional cooperation which the 
South Pacific now enjoys exists comfortably within the state system which has 
emerged with decolonization. Progress to stage four of Nye's typology involves a 
denial of at least some elements of nationalism and the creation of some supra-
national institutions which imply weakened state authority. There must be a 
measure of doubt that countries so recently independent will wish to surrender 
their national prerogatives easily. Indeed, the experience of the regional airlines 
and shipping lines negotiatiOns show how difficult such a surrender of state 
authority is for these countries even where there is general agreement that 
substantial regional gains would be forthcoming. 
The Evolution of South Pacific Regionalism 
Few of the institutions of South Pacific regionalism are entirely indigenous 
to the area. As one of the last regions to be swept by the "winds of change," the 
initiative for such matters, as for all else, was exercised in capitals far removed 
from the South Pacific. Complicating the issue was the division of the area among 
six metropolitan powers. Thus, the need for regional cooperation was first 
interpreted and expressed by the governing Europeans to satisfy essentially 
European perceptions and requirements which ranged from administrative efficien-
cy to imperial security; from racism to humanitarianism. 3 This colonial experience 
has had fundament~l implications for contemporary South Pacific regionalism. It 
has helped to set both the limits dnd the terms of the subsequent debate. 
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It would be only a slight misrepresentation to say that the current state of 
regional association in the South Pacific derives from the decision by Australia and 
New Zealand in 1944 to establish a welfare commission for the area. The motives 
of the two Australasian governments in advancing their proposal were not total1y 
selfless. The Australian foreign minister, Dr. H. V. Evatt, for example, harbored a 
firm desire to unite all the islands on Australia's northern and eastern flanks in 
some military al1iance and the proposed welfare agency was one step in this 
direction.4 After three years of progress by fits and starts, a treaty (known as the 
Canberra Agreement) was signed by Australia, France, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States to "encourage and strengthen 
international cooperation in promoting the economic and social welfare and 
advancement of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories in the South 
Pacific region administered by them.,,5 The organization created by the Canberra 
Agreement, the South Pacific Commission, was to be a functional institution 
without any political powers which would acquit itself of its responsibilities by 
providing expert advice to the administering authorities. 
The SPC established a number of essential precedents for South Pacific 
regionalism. Most importantly it defined the scope of the region. As originally set 
in the Canberra Agreement the boundaries of the region included all the islands 
westward of Pitcairn to West New Guinea and from Norfolk in the south to the 
Gilberts in the north. Only two changes have occurred since 1947; Guam and the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands were added in 1951 and West New Guinea was 
deleted in 1962. Perhaps equally interesting were the exclusions from the area 
defined by the SPC-East Timor, Easter Island, and Hawaii. These territories (and 
perhaps one or two others not so seriously considered) were excluded from the 
intended ambit of the SPC for definite, if not always explicit, reasons. These 
decisions contributed as much to present views of the region's scope as did the 
positive inclusions. Today few question that the existing ambit of the SPC defines 
the South Pacific region even though, as will be seen below, this definition 
constitutes a major source of tension between the SPC and the Forum. 
Another significant repercussion from the Canberra Agreement was the 
innovation of a regional council for South Pacific Islanders. The South Pacific 
Conference was only to meet triennially as an auxiliary, advisory body to the 
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Commission but it established the principle nonetheless that Islanders should meet 
periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest. It was this organ of the SPC 
which was to contribute so much to the development of a regional sentiment in the 
South Pacific. For the first time, an opportunity existed for South Pacific Islanders 
to gather together and, if not formally, at least informally discover a sense of 
commonality and discuss the implications of this affinity. 
With the mounting pressures for decolonization within the various South 
Pacific dependencies from the late 1950s came a parallel demand to localize the 
SPC, the area's one inter-governmental association. The initial breakthrough was 
reached when Western Samoa was allowed to accede to the Canberra Agreement in 
1965, three years after its achieved independence, but most subsequent reforms 
centered on the South Pacific Conference. By forcing the Commission to call 
annual meetings of the Conference, allowing an Islander to chair the Conference, 
and permitting the Conference to examine and comment directly on the work 
program, the Conference created for itself the means through which it might 
achieve its ultimate aspiration, the decolonization of the SPC. By 1970, the 
Conference felt the time had arrived to press for complete equality. An Islander, 
Afioga Afoafouvale Misirnoa of Western Samoa, was then Secretary-General and 
the Conference had a major say in the work program even to the point of making 
voluntary contributions to help pay for the organization's limited schedule of 
projects. 
The most irksome feature of the SPC for Islanders as it existed in 1970 was 
its proscription on all political debate. They wished to consider collectively the 
principal issues of the day and could see no reason why these aspirations should be 
frustrated by the metropolitan powers who found such questions as the French 
nuclear tests on Mururoa embarraSSing. For their part, the European states did not 
appreciate why the eighteen member Conference should wish to delve into matters 
for which only four could take any direct political responsibility. 6 A test of wills 
was joined at the Suva meeting of the Conference in September 1970 and the 
Conference lost; primarily due to the intransigence of France and the only slightly 
less adamant opposition of Great Britain and the United States. 
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As a direct result of the Islanders' failure in Suva, the South Pacific Forum 
was created the following year to give the region, or at least part of it, a political 
voice. A largely exploratory meeting of heads of government from the Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Western Samoa met with Australia and New Zealand 
in Wellington in August 1971. This was followed six months later with a session in 
Canberra and, by the third meeting in Suva in September 1972, the Forum had 
taken shape. In addition to annual meetings of heads of government (or their 
foreign ministers), there was to be a small permanent executive agency-cum-
secretariat known as the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) 
to be headed by the then Tongan Treasurer, M ahe Topouniua. 7 Over the years since 
its inception the Forum has pursued issues of the first magnitude of importance to 
the region. These include regional aviation and shipping, telecommunications, the 
law of the sea, fisheries development and control, and the French nuclear tests. 
The organization has also expanded its membership. The Gilberts (soon to be 
Kiribati), Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, and Tuvalu have now joined the 
original seven members. 
Although compelled to resort to a separate organization to achieve their 
political aims, the Islanders' efforts to restructure the SPC were not abnegated. A 
major review in 1973 resulted in a memorandum of understanding which was signed 
in Rarotonga in September 1974 effecting an almost complete merger of the 
European-dominated Commission and the Islander Conference. It also greatly 
expanded the powers of the (new) Conference in control over the work program and 
budget. Another review in 1976 virtually completed the merger by eliminating the 
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more significant vestiges of the old Commission. Neither review, however, 
bestowed the right to indulge in political debate. 
The 1976 SPC review took place under some rather extraordinary circum-
stances for, although ostensibly only concerned with reform of the SPC, it was 
widely recognized that many Forum members had decided to have done with what 
they considered a charade and hoped this review would provide the vehicle to 
secure the demise of the SPC. It was not so much that the Forum members had 
completely abandoned what the SPC had once represented to them but that they 
had abandoned the old avenues of reform. Their strength and numbers convinced 
many in the Forum that they could achieve the type of regional organization they 
had wanted in 1970 by simply replacing the SPC with the Forum. 
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Problems of Regional Association in the South Pacific 
Before undertaking a brief overview of some current issues facing the 
institutions of regionalism in the South Pacific, I should reiterate that, in general, I 
accept the functionalist interpretation of regional organization. Thus I am inclined 
to see more value in functional associations such as the SPC than would someone 
who prefers the more direct approach permitted only through political institutions. 
Clearly this view is in no sense antagonistic to politically competent regional 
agencies. The functionalist interpretation anticipates that non-political associa-
tions will give rise sooner or later to political organization. Indeed, I would argue 
that the existence of the South Pacific Forum should enhance significantly the 
value of functional associations such as the SPC if a proper balance between the 
two bodies can be achieved. What is at stake, therefore, is the premium one 
attaches to the "relics" of successful ramification. 
The SPC itself stands as something of a monument to the functionalist 
approach. Over the past thirty years it has ramified in a number of directions. 
Among its direct spillover effects may be counted the South Pacific Games, the 
South Pacific Arts Festival, and the South Pacific Forum. Indirectly, the SPC has 
helped to generate the University of the South Pacific and the Pacific Islands 
Producers' Association (PIPA).8 This last named resulted, like the Forum, from 
frustrated efforts wi thin the SPC which therefore finally had to seek redress in a 
separate organization. In 1974 PIPA was absorbed into SPEC as their membership 
and purposes had almost completely overlapped. 
Fundamental to the SPC-Forum dilemma now confronting South Pacific 
regionalism is the issue of geographic scope versus functional comprehensiveness. 
The SPC can offer the former and the Forum can provide the latter but neither 
both. The SPC continues to be able to unite the entire South Pacific because it 
eschews politics, a situation which permits France, Great Britain, and the United 
States to accept the involvement of their dependencies in regional activities. The 
Forum, being comprised of independent and self-governing states, is vitally 
concerned with the great problems of the region and therefore must exercise its 
political powers to seek solutions in whatever direction these take. The matter 
appears stalemated since the metropolitan powers will not permit politics within 
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the SPC and the Forum states have so far refused to accept a less geographically 
complete definition of the South Pacific region. 
That the dilemma exists at all can be attributed to a sort of prevailing 
historical determinism in the minds of many in the South Pacific. For a decade 
PIPA and the SPC coexisted without giving rise to any serious demarcation 
disputes. The Forum almost from its inception has been viewed by its members and 
most external observers as a successor body to the SPC. Long years of struggle to 
localize the SPC created a vision in the minds of many South Pacific politicians and 
public servants of what characteristics a "proper" regional organization should 
display. This image was manifested in the Forum from 1971. Thus, implicit rivalry 
has always been expected between the two. The establishment of SPEC only 
heightened expectations of institutional jealousy and in recent years charges of 
duplication and poaching have been duly laid by each although these charges have 
yet to be sustained in detail. 
During the 1976 SPC review, considerable attention was necessarily focused 
on relations between the SPC and SPEC. Both to reduce the potential for 
duplication and to recognize the increasing range of activities being undertaken by 
SPEC, the review committee recommended that the SPC concentrate its efforts 
more towards "grass-roots" development. 9 This view was adopted by the 
subsequent Conference meeting. A Forum review of regional aid arrangements in 
the same year proffered a less moderate solution to the demarcation dispute. The 
review's report, in effect, suggested that the SPC commit suicide and will its assets 
to SPEC. 10 Tensions between the SPC and SPEC also occupied a substantial 
portion of the discussions at the 1977 meeting of the Conference. The three non-
Forum metropolitan powers (France, Great Britain and the U.S.) were annoyed that 
two projects researched by the SPC were to be transferred to the Forum for 
implementation. Loss of the comprehensive environmental management program 
was mildly worrying but the release of the regional fisheries agency especially 
stung the American delegation which then called for a clear delineation between 
the functions of the SPC and SPEC. 
In almost every regard the tension over demarcation has, however, been a 
spurious dispute. The original difference between the two bodies remains, as it 
must, the ultimate dividing line for responsibilities. The Forum acts with political 
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authority while the SPC does not. Regardless of whatever functional delineation 
might be devised to distinguish between the SPC and the Forum, the barrier can 
never be complete. Virtually any matter may become political. Whenever an issue 
becomes politicized, as did both the fisheries and conservation research of the SPC, 
then the Forum will fulfill its raison d'thre and act to secure coordinate action by 
the regional governments. This method of delineation obviously confers the 
initiative on the Forum since, merely by expressing an interest in a matter, the 
member governments can pre-empt SPC action. The SPC is powerless to do more 
than protest. (Even here, however, the SPC is limited by the fact that Forum 
members can control the vote in the Conference since they have twelve of the 
11 twenty-three votes normally cast.) 
While the Forum derives its particular strength from its political authority, 
it is not as free to act politically as may first appear. The Forum lacks a major 
advantage of the SPC-its geographic comprehensiveness. The SPC is the only 
inter-governmental association which spans the entire area now considered "the 
South Pacific." This territorial inclusiveness confers more than psychic prestige; it 
has practical significance. The restricted geographic scope of the Forum 
circumscribes its options uncomfortably at times and especially when the issue 
involved concerns a matter of importance to the whole of the South Pacific. This 
became particularly apparent in 1977 and 1978 during the negotiation on the then 
proposed regional fisheries agency. Rather than treat the issue solely at the Forum 
level, the Forum arranged a wider meeting to encompass the whole of the South 
Pacific. The result was a convocation virtually identical in composition to the 
South Pacific Conference. As became evident at the Niue Forum in 1978, the rate 
of expansion in the Forum's membership must decline and few aspirations can be 
held that a complete overlap in membership between the SPC and the Forum will 
occur at an early date. The concurrent offer by the Niue Forum of easier entry 
into SPEC is unlikely to serve as an acceptable alternative to those territories 
excluded from Forum membership. 
Not only is the demarcation dispute overstated, the logic which claims that 
the Forum must emerge as a successor to a declining SPC appears to me to be 
somewhat faulty. Underlying this argument, any misreading of the theory of 
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regionalism apart, is the view that the South Pacific cannot afford two regional 
organizations. The specific interpretation of "afford"· is rarely made explicit 
although generally it is assumed that the term carries economic connotations. 
Economic implications are admittedly an important element of the regional 
calculus but other matters demand consideration as well. Political circumstances 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations involved must also be taken 
into account. 
In economic terms, the prima facie evidence suggests that the South Pacific 
would be poorer were the SPC to be forced out of existence to make way for the 
Forum. Approximately 95 percent of the SPC's budget (nearly $4,000,000 
Australian) originates from the five European members. Little expectation could 
be held that the three states excluded from the Forum-France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States-would contribute at the same level to a regional 
body of which they were not members. Further, it must be doubted that Australia 
and New Zealand would, in effect, pay double subscriptions to the one organization 
if the Forum were to expunge the SPC. Additional sources of financial assistance 
could be lost as well since the SPC attracts aid to the region through joint projects 
which presently fall outside the Forum's interest. Thus the hypothesized economies 
of scale which might result through merging the SPC and the Forum could easily 
prove illusory in practice. 
A second aspect of the cost/benefit calculus for a single regional 
organization raises politico-economic questions. While the SPC will continue to 
lose its former pride of place in South Pacific regionalism, as long as it exists the 
SPC will serve as a form of insurance against the complete loss of regional 
contacts. Political associations are subject to greater stresses than functional 
organizations and are therefore intrinsically less stable. The politicization of the 
SPC's sister organization, the Caribbean Commission, contributed significantly to 
the demise of that body in 1964 and, with the subsequent failure of the West Indies 
federation, left the Caribbean region with few outlets. for regional cooperation. 
The same pattern was repeated in East Africa. Again, whatever economies may be 
achieved in concentrating responsibilities into a monopolistic regional structure 
these economies will entail the putting of all the South Pacific's regional eggs in 
the one basket. The potential cost of surrendering the insurance created by the 
existence of the SPC could well be much higher than those favoring its abolition 
may suppose. 
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Although not prepossessing when compared with the Forum, the SPC does 
have some strengths in its own right beyond merely its geographic inclusiveness 
which do contribute to the success of South Pacific regionalism. Firstly, being a 
non-political association, the SPC provides an arena in which new or experimental 
ideas in regional cooperation may be tested without the risk of serious political 
embarrassment. This could be seen as an important safeguard by the political 
leaders of the Forum for whom any kind of failure may bring adverse electoral 
consequences. Research and development always involve risks and costs--even in 
the area of regional cooperation. Secondly, the advantages of a non-political 
international gathering extend to states other than the participating countries. The 
Conference is open to observers in a way that a heads of government meeting like 
12 the Forum can never be. A t the 1977 and 1978 Conferences, for example, states 
'such as Canada, Chile, and Japan were able to gain access to South Pacific opinion 
on the regional initiatives which concerned them (mainly fisheries) without having 
to take official note of these views. They purchased this benefit at a price, 
however, since the observers had to listen to complaints against foreign activities 
in the region; again without any ground being given for official annoyance. The 
presence of observer countries and international organizations confers a third 
advantage on the SPC. The Conference affords an opportunity for the dependent 
territories to engage in a variety of diplomatic contacts which would ordinarily be 
denied them by their dependency status. Finally, the SPC's less dramatic work 
program does attempt to resolve common but mundane problems within the region 
such as atoll sanitation and village nutrition which would not often attract great 
political interest. 
It must be admitted that as a would-be successor to the SPC, the South 
Pacific Forum boasts some noteworthy advantages. The Forum has made an 
enormous contribution to regional cooperation simply by its willingness to tackle 
the awkward problems which were previously allowed to fester. In a region where 
only two countries (Fiji and PNG) are materially larger than the city of Hobart 
(population 160,000), the Forum has given the South 'Pacific a more substantial 
voice in world affairs. This enhanced diplomatic capacity has occasionally been 
employed by the Islands against Australia and New Zealand but more commonly has 
been bolstered by the international standing of the two Australasian powers to win 
concessions outside the region. Although in existence less than eight years, the 
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Forum has made remarkable progress in such areas of regional cooperation as 
communications, fisheries, shipping and trade relations. Nevertheless, the 
organization is not without its limitations. 
As with any regional organization, national interests prevent a complete 
harmony of purpose within the Forum. Nationalism for many years frustrated all 
attempts by the Forum to establish the regional shipping line. A comprehensive 
regional civil aviation agreement stili eludes the Forum although Fiji's Prime 
Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese ,\i1ara, warned at the Forum's 1974- meeting that failure 
in this area would undermine the Forum as an instrument of regional cooperation. 
The costs of the regional university, the University of the South Pacific in Suva, 
are met in part by subscriptions from among the participating countries and here 
too cooperation sometimes breaks down as countries argue over the relative levels 
of their individual subscriptions. Such difficulties are certainly no worse than those 
experienced by similar organizations elsewhere but, particularly as in the case of 
the air consortium, one is reminded that the Forum's problems with nationalism 
cannot be discounted as inconsequential. Indeed, because the political competence 
of the Forum leads it to undertake the difficult problems of policy coordination 
across national boundaries, the implications of differences in the perception of 
national interest are likely to be, in general, much more serious for the Forum than 
the less poli tical S Pc. 
Another source of tension derives from the restricted membership of the 
present Forum. The Forum has long had the image of being a Commonwealth club. 
When the Gilbert Islands were prematurely granted full membership in 1977 
although not yet independent, the suggestion that special allowances would be made 
for Commonwealth territories was reinforced. This image was confirmed the 
following year at the Niue Forum where the question of expanded membership 
produced acrimonious debate. That the Forum enjoys an exclusively Common-
wealth membership cannot be attributed solely to the preferences of current 
members, however. The primary reason has been the. failure of the French and 
American authorities to create independent former colonies which would be 
technically eligible for membership. While some of the states at the Niue Forum 
declared themselves in favor of a more flexible entry procedure, the majority felt 
that overly lax requirements would allow France and the United States into the 
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Forum by proxy. One test of the Forum's attitude towards the non-Commonwealth 
Pacific will take place later this year when the organization considers observer 
status for Micronesia and the New Hebrides. 
Concern over membership very early in the Forum's existence also high-
lighted another possible source of strain within the Forum. Fiji blocked an 
Australian supported application by PNG for membership at the February 1972 
Forum meeting on the grounds that the territory was not yet independent. The 
recriminations which followed in the media of each country demonstrated clearly 
that Polynesian-Melanesian rivalries were not entirely dead. A face-saving device 
was arranged by the next Forum meeting when the status of invited observer was 
instituted. The problem re-emerged under the euphemistic rubric "sub-regionalism" 
at the 1978 Niue Forum when most of the divisive issues appeared to involve a 
Polynesian-Melanesian cleavage. 13 Sub-regional or cultural factionalism may 
increase as an issue for the Forum if its membership continues to expand and 
diversify. 
The expression of regional cooperation may be in the transnational 
coordination of governmental policy but its essence is the sentiment of 
commonali ty. This sense of commonality, however, is highly dependent upon a pool 
of shared community values. The larger and more diverse the membership of the 
Forum, the more diluted this pool will become. In consequence the fragile tissue of 
mutual trust needed to sustain regional cooperation in the South Pacific could be 
stretched to the breaking point. Certainly the divisive influences of nationalism 
and sub-regionalism will come more readily to the fore if the sentiment of 
commonality is seriously diminished for, while there is no immutable law of 
international relations which compels a regional organization to choose between 
breadth of membership and internal intimacy, controversy does appear to be a 
function of the diversity of opinion. It is primarily for this reason that some Forum 
states harbor concern lest the organization lose its Commonwealth character in the 
near future. 
Perhaps the most intangible aspect of the Forum's future is also its most 
significant. This is the degree to which the organization is dependent on the vision, 
statesmanship, and personality of Ratu Mara. Since 1965 he has dominated all the 
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horizons of South Pacific regionalism. Much of the reform of the SPC was at his 
instigation; the Forum probably owes its existence to his energies. Of course, it 
would be grossly unfair to attribute the current state of regionalism in the South 
Pacific entirely to Ratu Mara but he does seem to have infected a whole generation 
of leadership throughout the region with his imagination and enthusiasm. Therefore 
the question must be posed, even if it cannot yet be answered, "Will South Pacific 
regionalism survive the second generation of leadership?" The early indicators are 
not altogether ausplCious. Much of the heat of the Niue Forum was fired by an 
apparent generational conflict as newer leaders like Western Samoa's Taisi Tupuola 
Efi and the Cook's Tom Davis challenged the old guard over its control of the 
Forum's direction. 
Conclusions 
This rather sketchy treatment of some of the problems affecting organiza-
tion in the South Pacific does not lend itself to many firm conclusions. Indeed, as I 
have only one basic observation to make, it may best be presented in the context of 
a brief restatement of this paper's themes. It may well be that there is a 
significant connection between the economic prospects of the South Pacific and the 
strength of its regional associations. Certainly this was the view taken thirty years 
previously by the six imperial powers when they established the SPC. As the SPC 
succeeded in promoting regional cooperation, it kindled a desire among the rapidly 
decolonizing local states for more. The refusal of some metropolitan countries to 
accept a political association forced the Islands to establish a separate regional 
institution, the Forum, to satisfy their aspirations for a higher level of cooperation 
and interaction. The circumstances surrounding the Forum's creation have tended 
to encourage a sense of rivalry and competition between the Forum and SPC which 
I believe is both spurious and unnecessary. 
Based in part on the functionalist interpretation of regionalism, I do see 
considerable merit in flexibility and choice in regional ~association. This is both a 
general theoretical position and a view based on the recent developments in the 
South Pacific. Hence my single conclusion: an early merger of the Forum and the 
SPC may well be of dubious advantage to South Pacific ·regionalism. The presumed 
economies of concentrating all responsibility into a single institution must be 
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discounted against the risks to each organization and thus to the sentiment of 
regionalism they represent. Regional cooperation requires not only that strengths 
be shared but weaknesses as weJJ. If regional organizations are to contribute fuHy 
to regional cooperation neither can their capacities be overestimated nor their 
shortcomings minimized. The SPC has strengths which have not always been 
recognized but which, I believe, enhance the quality of regional cooperation in the 
South Pacific. The Forum's impact has been remarkable but· its weaknesses, 
although of a different order to those of the SPC, can only be ignored with risk. 
Given the current climate of opinion, the pressure to resolve the "problem" 
of two regional organizations in the South Pacific will be with its leaders for some 
time to come. Ultimately perhaps such pressure may produce an umbrella 
organization under which a variety of lesser regional associations wiU shelter and 
through which they will maintain a creative pattern of reciprocal relationships. 
The shape of this umbrelJa institution cannot yet be discerned but it would not 
surprise me if it had a general assembly which looked remarkably like a South 
Pacific Conference, an executive council something like a streamlined Forum, and 
a secretariat much like a combination of SPEC and the SPC's Secretariat. This 
scenario, however, appears to me to be one of middle future rather than the near 
future unless a drastic redefinition of the region is to occur. 
For the more immediate future, the development o~ a regional system based 
on a harmonious relationship between the SPC and the Forum seems both feasible 
and desirable. Were both organizations to take full advantage of each other's 
strength and encourage the development of each other's potential instead of 
attempting to exploit the other's weaknesses, regionalism would be even more 
healthy than its present robust state. For example, creative use of the SPC's 
capacity for experimentation and risk-taking in unexplored areas of regional 
cooperation would relieve the Forum of the perils of research and development 
which could overload it politically. In return this more sensitive approach to the 
SPC would add coherence and relevance to the SPC's work program. Similarly, 
skillful usage of the Conference's array of observers could enlarge the impact of 
regional decisions without committing the Forum states to a single political 
posture. The stature of the Forum could, in return, lend diplomatic support to 
members of the SPC which lack credible alternative outlets. 
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The range and flexibility of options open through a systemic, as opposed to a 
single organization, approach argues strongly for this strategy in regional 
cooperation. This is all the more true when the economic and political costs of the 
strategy are not clear and indeed as in the South Pacific may well be less than the 
single organization al ternati vee It is instructive to observe that, even where 
regionalism is most highly developed-Western Europe, no single organization has 
emerged to orchestrate the entire scope of regional cooperation in this part of the 
world. The European Economic Community exists to serve one set of aspirations 
and NATO another. The South Pacific will probably never enjoy the enormous 
extent of regional association which characterizes contemporary Western Europe 
but it can secure the advantages of a valuable partnership between its two major 
inter-governmental associations. Rhetoric and jealousy should not stand in the way 
of effective use of the South Pacific's limited regional resources. 
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Polynesia occupied the core and much of Melanesia was on the periphery • 
. The emergence of Melanesia in recent years has tended to shift the core 
westward and countries such as the Cooks and Western Samoa have felt a 
need to resist a diminished role for themselves as a result. Fiji is of course 
the pivot for this issue since it has a foot in each camp~ as it were. 
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